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ANNUAL I.H.S. - EBERHARD STUDENT 
WRITING COMPETITION WINNER 
A CONTRACTUAL APPROACH 
TO DATA PRIVACY 
STEVEN A. BIBAS* 
We live in an information society. The computerized networks 
of data encircling our lives bring us myriad benefi ts .  The free 
flow of credit data lets a creditor trust a borrower even if they are 
strangers . Nationwide computer bulletins help police capture fu­
gitive felons. Financial market information permits investors to 
price gocds accurately, balancing supply and demand. Commu­
nication between banks allows Californians to use their auto­
mated-teller-machine (ATM) cards in Boston or Berlin. 
But every silver lining has a cloud. Although the ready availa­
bility of information helps us to trust others and coordinate ac­
tions, i t  also lessens our privacy. George Orwell presciently 
expressed our fear of losing all privacy to an omniscient Big 
Brother.1 Computers today track our telephone calls, credit-card 
spending, plane flights, educational and employment records, 
medical histories, and more . Someone with free access to this 
information could piece together a coherent picture of our 
actions. 
Big Brother is not watching-yet. The prospect, however, of 
easy access to personal data makes many Americans squirm.2 The 
status quo poorly protects data privacy. The predictable Ameri­
can response has been to cry " [ t] here oughta be a law"3 and pro­
pose the creation of a federal government agency.4 Most 
* B.A., 1989, Columbia College; B.A., 1991, Oxford University; J.D. Candidate, 1994, 
Yale Law School. The author would like to thank Ralph Brown, John Elwood, Pavan 
Heard, Dan Klein, Renee Lettow, Geoff Ritts, and Eugene Volokh for their advice and 
comments on earlier drafts of this Article. 
1. GEORGE 0RvVELL, 1984 (Signet Classics 1983) (1949). 
2. See infra Part I.A. 
3. Todd Purdum, He Didn't Slash Budgets, N.Y. Tr:-..rEs, Apr. 26, 1992, § 4, at 6 (referring 
generally, and not in the context of data privacy, to American reliance on this "venerable 
democratic maxim"). 
4. See DAVID BuRNHAM, THE RlsF. OF THE CoMPUTER. STATE 243 ( 1980) (opposing such 
proposals and calling them a cure "more deadly than the disease"). 
592 Harvard journal of Law & Public Policy [Vol. 17 
proposed solutions focus on centralized legislation and 
regulation.5 
Portraying the choice as centrally planned government action 
versus doing nothing creates a false dichotomy. A contractual so­
lution could give individuals the power to choose privacy or not 
without requiring privacy for everybody or nobody. This Article 
argues that a contractual solution would be superior to ap­
proaches dictated by legislators, bureaucrats, or judges because it 
would be more sensitive to individual preferences. 
This Article looks only at private-sector data banks such as 
credit bureaus; data gathering by government agencies raises dif­
ferent issues.6 Furthermore, this Article focuses on proposals lim­
iting the dissemination of accurate data.7 Finally, rather than 
speculating about the possible sale of intimate secrets,8 this Arti­
cle discusses types of information that businesses commonly han­
dle, such as addresses and credit histories. 
Part I of this Article outlines concerns about privacy and finds 
that Americans share no consensus on the importance of the 
problem. Moreover, an information economy produces large 
countervailing benefits. Any solution should be sensitive to indi­
vidual valuations of the tradeoffs involved instead of giving pri­
vacy to everybody or nobody. Part II discusses proposed solutions 
involving legislation, administrative regulation, state constitu­
tional rights, and tort law. Part III criticizes these proposals be­
cause they inefficiently ignore individual preferences and 
valuations. Under such regimes, some people would get less pri­
vacy than they wanted and others would get more than they 
wanted. Part IV sketches the legal bases for a contractual ap-
5. See infra Part II.A. 
6. Because the government often compels disclosure by threatening to impose civil or 
criminal sanctions, the data giver's consent is a problematic, if not illusory, notion. The 
private sector, furthermore, provides data givers greater bargaining power because private 
businesses, unlike government organizations, usually lack monopoly power. 
7. Much of the literature on data privacy confuses two analytically distinct issues by 
discussing privacy concerns along with concerns about false information. See, e.g., Ken· 
neth L. K.'1rst, "The Files": Legal Controls ova the Accuracy and Acce.ISibility of Stored Personal 
Data, 31 L-\.W & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 342 (1966); Arthur R. Miller, Personal Privacy in the 
Computer Age: The Chalienge of a New Technology in an Information-Oriented Society, 67 MICH. L. 
REv. 1089, 1114-19 ( 1969); Lauretta E. Murdock, Comment, The Use and Abuse of Com,tmter­
ized Infonnalion: StTiking a Balance Between Personal Privacy Jntae5tS and Organiwtional njer ­
mation Needs, 44 ALB. L. REv. 589, 602 (1980); Simson L. Garfinkel, Putting Jl;[ore Teeth in 
Consumer Rights, CHRISTIAN Sci. MoNITOR, Aug. 8, 1990, at 13; H1hat PTice Privacy?, CoN­
su�tER REP., May 1991, at 356, 357. These articles stem from well-grounded complaints 
about the difficulties consumers face when, for instance, they try to correct inaccurate 
credit reports. 
8. See infm text accompanying notes 26-28. 
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·oach, outlines its mechanics, and discusses its benefits.  This Ar­
:le concludes that a contractual solution would best balance the 
dividual 's  desire for privacy against the rights of others to bene­
. from the information economy. 
I .  THE PRIVACY PROBLEM 
Many people fear the loss of their privacy in a computerized 
Jaked Society."9 Others, however, are le$S concerned about the 
�ed for privacy and may be unwilling to sacrifice the benefits 
:nerated by the information economy. Thus, there is no con­
nsus about the importance of privacy vis-a-vis the benefits of an 
formation economy. One extreme solution, privacy for every­
)dy, would deprive many people of benefits they value more 
ghly; the other extreme, privacy for nobody, would disregard 
,e strong privacy preference of others. 10 The law should eschew 
,ese extremes in favor of the golden mean: a solution tailored 
' individual preferences and values .  
A. Data Banks and the Threat to Privacy 
1. The Information Industry 
Private data banks have mushroomed over the past few de­
tdes,  generating a spate of dire predictions .1 1 American com­
Liters hold more than five billion records. On average , they 
ade information on every man, woman, and child five times per 
ay. 1 2  For instance, consumer credit bureaus hold 400 million 
·edi t  files and make possible 1.5 million credit decisions each 
ay. 13 More than one thousand local credit bureaus, operating 
1rough three national networks, keep files on almost ninety per­
:nt of American adults.14 Each month, bureaus receive informa­
on about debtors from creditors; bureaus also check court 
�cords and other sources.15 Credi t  bureaus contain data on con-
9. VANCE PACKARD, THE NAKED SocrETY ( 1964). 
10. See ir�(m Part III. 
11. See generally Buru·aL-'.!-.1, supra note 4; DAVJD F. Lrl'JOWES, PRIVACY TN AMERICA: Is YouR 
tTV.>.TE LIFE Il': THE PUBLIC EYE? ( 1989); RoBERT E. SMITH, PRrvAct: How To PROTECT 
HAT's LEFT oF IT ( 1979); M.o\.Lcour W .. \RNER & MrcHAEL STONE, THE 0.\TA BA.'>K SociETY: 
RGANIL-'.TTONs, Co:.IPUTERS AND SociAL fREEoo:-..1 (1970). 
12. jEFFREY RoTHFEDER, PRrvAGt FOR SALE 17 (1992) . 
13. Leonard Sloane, Credit Bureaus Draw Fire for Misuse of Data, N.Y. T!,!ES, June 22, 
)91, at 48. 
14. lv7wl Price Privacy�, su,bra note 7, at 3.56. The three national bureaus are Equifax, 
rans Union, and TRW. !d. 
15. See id. at 356-.57. 
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sumers' credit cards, loans, payment histories, bankruptcy liens 
and judgments, past addresses, years of birth, and social security 
numbers.16 Credit bureaus routinely sell this information in the 
form of mailing lists, enabling direct-mail marketers to inundate 
consumers with catalogues, solicitations, and special offers.17 In 
1990, Lotus announced plans to use credit-bureau files to create 
a personal-computer database containing the names, addresses, 
demographic information, and purchasing habits of 120 million 
consumers . 18 
Databases are proliferating in other fields as well. Banks main­
tain comprehensive files on their customers '  financial transac­
tions. 1 9 The Employers' Information Service compiles lists of 
employees who have filed workers' compensation claims and law­
suits .20 Other databases keep track of eviction filings, tenants 
who damage apartments,  and arrests for violent  and drug-related 
crimes. 2 1 The MIB, which has health records on more than fif­
teen million Americans, releases confidential medical informa­
tion to insurance companies,22 and another database will soon 
alert doctors to litigation-prone patients.23 Two large trade 
groups are testing a pilot program that creates a database of peo­
ple's high school records for use by employers .24  Finally, mailing­
list databases rent out individuals' names up to tens of thousands 
of times per year. 25 
16. See, e.g., TRvV CREDIT DATA SERVICES, UNDERSTANDit-;G TRW's CREDIT REPORTING 
SERVlCE 2, 8 (1992); see also Dave Barry, Credit Rantings, WASH. PosT, Nov. 18, 1990, Maga­
zine, at 60; Simson L. Garfinkel, Privacy Issue Caught in Credit Network, CHRISTIAN Scr. MoNI­
TOR, july 18, 1990, at 1; What Price Privacy�. supra note 7, at 357. 
17. See, e.g., Simson L. Garfinkel, How Computers Help Tmget Buyers, CHRISTIAN SCI. Mot-;I­
TOR, july 25, 1990, at 13; What Price Privacy �. supra note 7, at 359-60. 
18. Mary J. Culnan, An Issue of Consumer Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1992, § 3, at 9. 
Lotus has cancelled this product, perhaps because of public complaints about the prod­
uct's impact on their privacy. See Daniel Mendel-Black & Evelyn Richards, Peering In to 
Private Lives: Computer Lists Now Profi le Consumers by Their Personal Habits, WAs! 1. PosT, Jan. 
20, 1991, at H1 (stating that Lotus "could be forced to pull or delay the product" because 
of compaints). 
19. See S!'-IITH, supra note 11, at 15-28. 
20. Richard Lacayo, Nowhere to Hide, TI,IE, Nov. 11, 1991, at 34. 
21. Simson L. Garfinkel, From Database to Blacklist, CHRISTIAN SCI. Mo:-.�ITOR, Aug. 1, 
1990, at 12. 
22. !d. The MIB was formerly known as the Medical Information Bureau. !d. For an 
interesting look at medical privacy, see Ted Cantrell, Privacy-The f.i[edical Problems, in 
PRrvAC.Y 195 Oohn B. Young eel., 1978). 
23. Tamar Lewin, Philadelj1hia Doctors to Be Offered Data on Patients Who Have Sued, N.Y. 
TI�!ES, Aug. 27, 1993, at A2l. 
24. Lacayo, supra note 20, at 35. 
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Databases, however, do not contain everything about you. Con­
trary to one writer's suggestion, Big Brother does not know about 
"every sexual fantasy you [have] had."26 Credit bureaus, for in­
stance, do not contain data on one's friends, relatives ,  religion, 
cultural tastes, political affiliation, or sexual orientation .27 Thus a 
credit bureau knows only "a very small part of the basic facts 
about a consumer's existence, facts that a casual acquaintance 
might know."28 Reform proposals should focus on commonly 
traded types of business information instead of being distracted 
by sensationalist Orwellian claims about issues like sexual privacy. 
2. The State of the Law 
The law imposes almost no restrictions on the sale of accurate 
information . Databases may freely disclose information about 
employment, criminal records, and tenants .  No federal law pro­
tects medical privacy, although Congress has considered such 
legislation.29 No federal law safeguards the privacy of insurance 
files .30 The only federal law on the privacy of bank information 
forbids disclosure to the government but does not restrict sale to 
private parties. 31 Laws place a few limits on the disclosure of 
videocassette rentals,32 educational records,33 and cable televi­
sion data,34 but there is no evidence that these were ever major 
26. Barry, supra note 16, at 60 (all capitalized in original). 
27. See TRW CREDIT DATA SERVICES, supra note 16, at 2; Daniel B. Klein & Jason 
Richner, In Defense of the Credit Bureau, 12 CATO ]. 393, 397 (1992). 
28. Klein & Richner, supra note 27, at 397. 
29. ROTHFEDER, supra note 12, at 177. 
30. Jd. at 27. 
31. See Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S. C.§§ 3401-34 ( 1988) (limiting conditions 
under which government institutions may obtain bank records; giving customers a right 
to authorize disclosure in writing and to revoke authorization at any time; and prohibit­
ing banks from requiring such authorization as condition of doing business). 
32. See Video Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (1988) (forbidding disclosure of 
videocassette rental records except under court order, subpoena, warrant, or with express 
contemporaneous written consent of consumer; requiring destruction of personally iden­
tifiable information after one year; but permitting sale of names and addresses and past 
rentals "if the disclosure is for the exclusive use of marketing goods and services directly 
to the consumer"). This last loophole practically swallows the protection of the section. 
33. See Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, 20 U.S. C.§ 1232g (1988) (pertaining 
to federally-funded schools) (guaranteeing parents access to educational records and for­
bidding release of such records to others without written consent, subject to specified 
exceptions). But cf Fay v. South Colonie Cent. Sch. Dist., 802 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1986) (hold­
ing that the Act creates no private cause of action). 
34. See Cable Communications Policy Act, 47 U.S.C. § 551 (1988) (prohibiting cable 
operators from gathering or disclosing personally identifiable information without sub­
scriber's prior consent unless (a) necessary for "a legitimate business acti\it';," (b) re­
quired by court order, or (c) viewing habits are blocked out; also requiring cable 
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sectors of the data trade .35 Although the Fair Credit Reporting 
Act ostensibly limits disclosures by credit bureaus,36 some courts 
have restricted its application to inaccurate information .37 The 
statute,  furthermore, permits a bureau to release a consumer 
credit report to anyone deemed to have "a legitimate business 
need" for the information.33 This exception has swallowed the 
statute. 39 Thus credit bureaus routinely sell mailing lists, lists of 
good debtors, and the l ike, without the slightest h indrance from 
the law.40 
State laws also fail to protect data privacy. Although many 
states have made tortious the public disclosure of private facts,41 
these torts only cover highly offensive, private matters of no legit-
operators to destroy personally identifiable information once retention is no longer 
necessary). 
35. The author has been unable to find a single case involving the commercial sale of 
videocassette rentals, educational records, or cable television data. 
36. See Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S. C. §§ 1681-1681 t (1988) (limiting permissible 
reasons for releasing credit reports, forbidding reporting of obsolete information, and 
requiring user of consumer credit reports to notify consumer when credit-report informa­
tion causes user to deny consumer credit). 
37. See Todd v. Associated Credit Bureau Servs., Inc., 451 F. Supp. 447, 449 (E.D. Pa. 
1977) (holding that court need not reach issue of reasonableness if, as threshold matter, 
credit report was accurate), ajfrl, 578 F.2d 1376 (3d Cir.), wt. denied, 439 U.S. 1068 
(1978); Roseman v. Retail Credit Co., 428 F. Supp. 643, 646 (E. D. Pa. 1977) (holding that 
an accurate report was not actionable because FCRA sought "to protect consumers from 
having inaccurate inforrnation circulated concerning them"); Austin v. Bankamerica Scrv. 
Corp., 419 F. Supp. 730, 732-33 (N.D. Ga. l974)(holding that accurate report docs not 
violate FCRA); see also Pendleton v. Trans Union Sys. Corp., 76 F.R.D. 192, 195 (E.D. Pa. 
1977) (denying class-action certification because of need to show that each class member 
suffered inaccuracy); Virginia G. Maurer, Common Law Defamation and the Fair Credit Repm­
ing Act, 72 CEO. L.J. 95, 124 (1984) (stating that "in general, courts are unwilling to permit 
actions under section l68lo when the information in the report is true"). 
38. See 15 U.S.C. § l6S1b (1988) (limicing consumer credit repon disclosure to situa­
tions invoiving court orders, written instructions by the consumer, creditors, employers, 
insurers, government benefit programs, and others having "a legitimate business need"). 
39. RoTHFEDEfl., supra note 12, at 55, 57 (stating that the bill "has been butchered; it 
was drawn and quartered and it.s vitals were left on the committee's chopping block" by 
the insertion of "[t]his remarkably broad exception" at the urging of industry lobbyists 
(quoting Professor Arthur Miller of Han•ard Law School)); see also Bonnie G. Camden, 
Comment, Fai,. Credit Reporting Act: What You Don't Know May Hwt You, 57 U. CrN. L. R.F.v. 
267, 267 (1988) (''The [Fair Credit Reporting Act], as interpreted today, frequently aJlm,·s 
dissemination of credit reports to people v.ithout a legitimate need for the reports."). 
Businesses, furthermore, have evaded the Act's strictures by obtaining reports fOI- pur­
poses not listed in the statute. According to some courts, such reports are not "consumer 
reports" and thus fall out-;ide the statute. See, e.g., Houghton v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co., 
795 F.2d 1144, 1148-49 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding that report obtained by insurance com­
pany about claimant's financial status was not consumer report because no consumer 
relationship existed between plaintiff and defendant); Henry v. Forbes, 433 F. Supp. 5, 6, 
8 (D. Minn. l 976) (iinding that report obtained by attorney for use in lobbying w<�.s not 
consumer report because it was not prepared for one of the specific statutory purposes). 
40. RoTHFF.DER, suj;ra note 12, at 26, 98 (noting that, for decades, industry has been 
seiling lists of consumers without hindrance by the Fair Credit Reporting Act). 
41. See generally REsTATU·!ENT (Sccoc.:o) OF ToRTS§ 6520 (1963 & App. 1977-1989). 
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imate public concern.42 Typically, data dissemination does not 
involve publicity as courts have defined the term,43 and i t  rarely 
involves highly offensive matters. As a result, "courts have usually 
rejected [privacy-tort] claims based on information privacy. "44 
Thus neither s tate nor federal law provides much data privacy 
protection. 
3. Privacy Concerns 
Many people care about data privacy. In a 1 990 poll, seventy­
nine percent of those polled were concerned about their per­
sonal privacy.45 Almost half of those surveyed thought " technol­
ogy had gotten out of control . "46 Even a decade ago, one third of 
Americans feared that we were on the verge of an Orwellian soci­
ety lacking all privacy.47 Reacting to this crisis, Congress has con­
sidered several data-privacy bills in recent years.48 
Several themes recur in the complaints of privacy advocates. 
First, data subjects are unaware of the use of their data.49 Second, 
42. !d. 
43. Jonathan P. Graham, Note, Privacy, Computers, and the Commercial Dissemination of 
Personal Information, 65 TEx. L. REv. 1395, 1 4 1 3  ( 1 987) ( citing Santiesteban v. Goodyear 
Tire & Rubber Co. ,  306 F.2d 9,  1 1  (5th Cir. 1962)). 
44. !d. 
45. vVhat Price Privacy?, supra note 7, at 356 (summarizing results of 1 990 Harris poll 
commissioned by Equifax, Inc.). 
46. !d. 
47. Louis HARRIS & AssociATES, Ir--:c. & ALAN F. WESTIN, THE DIMENSIONS OF PRrvACY 5 
( 1 98 1 ). 
48. See, e.g., Consumer Reporting Reform Act, S. 783, 1 03d Cong., 1 st Sess. ( 1 993); 
Consumer Reporting Reform Act, H.R. 1 0 1 5 ,  103d Cong., 1 st Sess. ( 1 993); Credit  Report­
ing Agencies Accuracy of Consumer Information Act, H.R. 6 1 9 ,  1 03d Cong., lst Sess. 
( 1 993); Fair Credit Reporting Amendments, H.R. 630, 1 03d Cong. , 1 st Sess. ( 1 993); Indi­
vidual Privacy Protection Act, H.R. 1 35 ,  1 03d Cong . .  1 st Sess. ( 1 993). 
Congress has considered other bi lls. The Consumer Credit Reporting Act would have 
tighted restrictions on the use and sale of credit reports. Time for Credit Horror Stories to 
End, L.A. TI�IES, Aug. 9, 1 992, at M4 (noting that the bill will be considered in 1 993). 
Representatives Richard Lehman, Charles Sc humer, and Matthew Rinaldo have intro­
duced bi l ls  to tighten access to credit reports. The bil ls  would both limit marketers' access 
to report<; and require deletion of old information. Garfinkel ,  Putting lv1ore Teeth in Con­
sumer Rights, supra note 7, at 1 3 ;  see also Michael W. Mil ler, Credit-Reporting Industry Will 
Launch Campaign to Forestall New Regulations, WALL ST. J., June 5, 1 99 1 ,  at B 1  ( sL"l.ting that 
Congress at that time was considering five bi l ls that would have tightened access to credit 
reports). Representative Bob ·wise has introduced a proposal to create a federal data­
protection board. Lacayo, supra note 20, at 35. At least three Congressional committees 
have held hearings on personal-data gathering. See Michael W. Mil ler, Hot Lists: Data !Vlills 
Delve Deep to Find lnfonnation A. bout Us Consumers, WALL ST. J., Mar. 1 4, 1 99 1 ,  at Al. Finally, 
Representative Schumer has sponsored a bil l  to curtail tenant-screening networks. Pam 
Belluck, Tenants Cry Foul as Screening Companies HfijJ Landlards Spot 'Problem' Applicants, 
WALL Sr . .J., Dec. 27, 1985, at 1 3. 
49. Culnan, supra note 1 8, at 9; Gat·finkel, How Computers Help Tmget Buyers, supra note 
17, at 13. 
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data gatherers routinely use information gathered ostensibly for 
one purpose, such as getting credit, for other purposes unantici­
pated by the data subject, such as employment and mailing 
lists .5° Finally, data subjects lack control over what happens after 
they release information.5 1 
B .  The Untold Side of the Story 
1. There Is No Consensus on the Importance of Privacy 
" [O ] ur society is at least ambivalent about the [ importance of] 
personal privacy," because individuals ' rights to privacy conflict 
with others' rights to know the truth .52 As one writer stated, " [i ] t's 
hard to find a national consensus on confidentiality in a nation 
of tell-all memoirs ,  inquiring pollsters and talk shows . .. "53 Half 
of those surveyed did not fear the improper use of information 
by business .54 Privacy, moreover, is a very subjective and mutable 
concept. "vVhat is private to one individual may not be private to 
his neighbor; what is considered private today may not be consid­
ered private tomorrow."55 Thus, Americans share no consensus 
about the value of privacy.56 
2. The Benefits of an Information Economy 
The uninhibited flow of financial information makes possible 
the liberal provision of credit.57 It enables creditors to trust con­
sumers about whom they have no first-hand knowledge.58 Accu-
50. See, e.g., Garfinkel,  How Computers Help Target Buyers, mpra note 1 7 ,  at 1 3; Lacayo, 
supra note 20, at 36 (discussing use of warranty-registration cards to generate stereo- and 
record-company mail ing l ists); Jacob Sul lum, SaTets for Sale: Do Strangers with Computers 
Know Too l'viuch About You?, REASON, Apr. 1 992, at 28, 32 (noting that privacy advocates 
argue "the Erst rule of info rmational p ri vacy [is]: Information disclosed for one purpose 
should not be used for another p urpose without the subject's conseEt"). 
51 . See Culnan, supra note 1 8, at 9; Mendel-Black & Richards, supra note 1 8 ,  at H l. 
52. Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and Brandt-is's 
Privacy Tort, 68 CoR�ELL L. REv. 291 , 326 ( 1 983). 
53. Lacayo, supra note 20, at 34. 
54. Lours HARRIS & AssociATES, INc. 8.: WEsTIN, svjna note 47, at 5 ( finding that 50% of 
those surveyed in 1978 did not worry about business misuse of personal information). 
55. ERIK GeRsoN, THE NAKED CoNSUMER 1 0  ( 1 992). 
56. This lack of consensus holds true even if one assumes that one-third of  the uncon­
cerned 50% (see suf!Ta note 54) are unconcerned solely because they are ignorant about 
how information is sold.  Under such an assumption, 33% of the consumers would not 
care about the diminution of data privacy. 
57. Jeremiah Smith, Conditional Privilege for lvlercantile Agencies-Macintosh v. Dun pt. l, 
1 4  CoLUM. L. REv. 1 87 ,  1 99 ( 1 914); Stephen Chapman, Credit Report: Friend or Foe>, WAsi-l. 
Trw:s, June 1 0, 1 99 1 , at F2; see also Fair Credit Reporting Act, 1 5  U.S.C. § 1 581(a)( l )  
( 1988); H. Hart, Privacy in the Financial Field, in PruVACY, supra note 22,  at 259, '279. 
58. Klein & Richner, sujna note 27,  at 396-97. 
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rate credit-history information allows creditors to charge lmver 
interest  rates to reliable debtors, thus encouraging all debtors to 
keep their promises. By turning consumers into repeat players, 
information networks overcome the incentives to cheat creditors 
in a prisoner's dilemma.59 Individuals benefit as well as busi­
nesses. Even one staunch critic of data dissemination admits that 
credit bureaus make i t  possible for the middle class to obtain 
both credit and lower prices.60 Thus, people with sound credit 
ratings have reason to favor the dissemination of their credit 
histories. 
The same logic applies to networks of landlords and employ­
ers: The dissemination of truthful information rewards good ten­
ants and employees and punishes defaulters and shirkers. 
Tenants who default on rent and damage apartments create costs 
that landlords pass on to other tenants. Tenants who turn their 
apartments into brothels or shops for illegal drugs worsen the 
quality of life for other tenants. Information networks allow land­
lords to screen out bad tenants, saving good tenants money and 
keeping out criminal activity and nuisances.61 
Even the much-maligned junk-mail industry serves a purpose. 
Many consumers er�joy receiving mailings and shopping at 
home.62 Mail-order shopping is convenient for those with small 
59. See Daniel B. Klein, Promise Keeping in the Great Society: A J'vlodel of Credit Information 
Sharing, 4 EcoN. & PoL. 1 17 ( 1992). See generally RoBERT AxELROD, THE EvoLUTION OF 
CooPERATION (1984) (demonstrating the importance of knowledge of past behavior and 
reciprocity in overcoming prisoner's dilemmas). 
The prisoner's dilemma is the name given to certain types of coordination problems in 
which each participant has an incentive to act selfishly even though cooperation would 
maximize their joint welfare. For a common example, suppose that the police have ar­
rested two thieves. The police take the prisoners into separate interrogation rooms and 
seek to make each one confess and testify against the other prisoner. If both prisoners 
remain silent, each will serve two years in jail. If one prisoner confesses while the other 
remains silent, the confessing prisoner will go free while the other prisoner will serve six 
years. If both prisoners confess, each prisoner will serve five years in jail. Under these 
circumstances, each prisoner has an incentive to confess and thus serve either zero or five 
years instead of two or six years. The best joint outcome would be for both thieves to 
remain silent and serve two years each; however, because of the coordination problem, 
the thieves probably will not both remain silent. For a numerical version of this scenario, 
see id. at 8-10. 
60. ROTHFE DER, supra note 12, at 43. 
61. See Belluck, supra note 48, at 11. But cf Garfinkel, From Database to Blacklist, supra 
note 2 1  (reciting anecdotal complaints of tenants and attorneys concerning tenant 
databases). 
62. Daniel Klein & Jason Richner, In Defense of that Pesky Junk J'vlail, CI-ll. TRIB., Apr. 20, 
1992, § 1, at 19; see also LINOWES, supra note 11, at 153. Some consumers actually pay 
money to have their names put on certain mailing lists. What Price Privacy?, supra note 7, at 
360. One study finds that 88% of people accept direct mail when they have the option of 
discontinuing it. Klein & Richner, supra, at 19. 
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children, physical disabilities, or insufficient time to go to 
stores.63 Strengthening the mail-order industry creates manufac­
turingjobs and reduces pollution and traffic congestion, because 
consumers no longer have to drive to malls. 64 More precise infor­
mation enables marketers to target only those consumers most 
likely to want to receive particular mailings ,  thereby reducing 
mailing costs and conserving paper. 65 
We must balance the value of the information industry against 
i ts costs in order to decide under what circumstances privacy is 
worthwhile . Because tradeoffs are involved, the law should avoid 
conferring too much privacy or too little. Any solution should 
reflect  individuals' varying valuations of privacy and the counter­
vailing benefits .66 
II .  PROPOSED SoLUTIONs 
Legislators and pundits have proposed data-privacy solutions 
involving legislation, regulation, state constitutional rights, and 
tort law. These approaches would require government officials to 
decide for everyone what tradeoffs are worth making for privacy. 
The proposals' centralized, one-size-fits-all solutions contrast with 
this Article's individuated solution . 
A. Legislative and Regulatory Solutions 
Some commentators have called for Congress to enact strin­
gent statutory measures.67 Each of the past four Congresses has 
considered legislation to establish a federal Data Protection 
Board.68 The Consumer Credit Reporting Act, considered in 
63. Klein & Richner, supra note 62, at 19. 
64. See id. 
65. !d. 
66. See infra Part III  (discussing how centralized solutions fall into the ali-or-nothing 
trap). 
67. See, e.g., Co/\tPUTER PROFESSIONALS FOR SociAL REsPONSIBILITY & U.S. PRIVACY CouN­
CIL, 1991 REPORT, quoted in Sullum, supra note 50, at 30 (supporting a stringent legislative 
solution); L>.RSON, supra note 55, at 237-39 (arguing for a flexible Omnibus Privacy Act 
and a constitutional privacy amendment); ARTHUR R. MILLER, THE AssAULT oN PRIVACY: 
CoMPUTERS, DATA BA."'KS, AND DossiERS, 185, 213, 220-38 (1971) (arguing that instead of 
leaving responsibility to individuals and letting "placebo" of consent operate, government 
should set up st.c1tutes or regulations); AL\N F. vVESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOi\1 386-88 
(1970) (advocating detailed legislative planning and administrative rules); !vliller, supra 
note 7, at 1170, 1229-44 (proposing tightening of statutory protection); Camden, su;bm 
note 39, at 292 (same); Murdock, supra note 7, at 610 (advocating federal legislation and 
administrative agency). 
68. See H.R. 685, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); H.R. 3669, lOlst Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); 
H.R. 638, 100th Cong., lst Sess. (1987); H.R. 1721, 99th Cong., lst Se�s. (1985). 
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1993, would have tightened restrictions on the use and sale of 
credit reports.69 Congress, moreover,  has recently held a flurry of 
hearings on possible restrictions on the sale of consumer data.70 
Others argue that Congress should pass enabling legislation to 
allow administrative regulations and an independent agency or 
commissioner to regulate data privacy.7 1  This administrative ap­
proach parallels that of many European countries, which have 
passed data-privacy legislation setting up centralized data protec­
tion boards.72 One purported virtue of the administrative ap­
proach is its flexibility and responsiveness to technological 
changes and new threats.73 Spiros Simitis argues that laws should 
69. Time for Credit Horror Stories to End, supra note 48, at A24. 
70. At least three congressional committees h ave held hearings on the subject. See 
Miller, Hot Lists: Data Mills Delve Deep to Find Information About Us Consumers, supra note 48, 
at Al.  
71. See Miller, supra note 7, at  1236; Kenneth J. Langan, Note, Computer Matching Pro­
grams: A Threat to Privacy ?, 15 COLUI.!. J.L. & Soc. PRoBs. 143, 177-78 (1979) ;  Murdock, 
supra note 7, at 610. 
72. In 1 984, Britain adopted the Data Protection Act. See Data Protection Act, 1984, ch. 
35 (Eng.). It requires data gatherers to register with a Data Protection Registrar. !d. §§ 4-
5. Data subjects enjoy rights of access to data, compensation for unauthorized disclosure 
or access or inaccurate data, and correction or erasure of inaccurate or misleading data. 
!d. §§ 21-24. Data users must follow eight data protection principles: 1 )  One must get and 
process information fairly and lawfully. 2) One may only hold it for specified and lawful 
purposes. 3) Data must be adequate, relevant, and not excessive in relation to that pur­
pose. 4) One may not use data for purposes other than those for which one gathered it. 
5) Data must be accurate. 6) One must not keep data longer than necessary. 7) One must 
inform data subjects of the existence of data on them and give them rights of access and 
correction. 8) Finally, data bureaus must take appropriate security measures. !d. sched. I ,  
pt. 1; see also J.A.L. STERLING, THE DATA PROTECTION ACT 1984: A GuiDE TO THE NEw 
LEGISLATION 'l! 'll 1250, 1260 ( 1985); Ian J. Lloyd, The Data Protection Act-Little Brother Fights 
Back?, 48 Moo. L. REv. 190, 192-93 ( 1 985 ) .  
Other countries have similar centralized solutions. The Irish Data Protection Act of 
1988 employs the same eight principles as the British Act. See RoBERT CL\RK, DATA PRo. 
TECTION L\w IN IRELAND 1 8, 45-57 ( 1990 ) .  Compare Irish Data Protection Act, No. 25 
( 1 988) (lr.) and Data Protection Act, 1984, ch. 35 (Eng.) with Council of Europe, Conven­
tion for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal 
Data (Strasbourg 1981) (showing that all three acts share nearly identical wording of 
eight principles).  The Irish Act also sets up a Data Protection Com missioner to enforce 
compliance. The Irish system pays little attention to individual wishes: "The entry on the 
register rather than the wishes of the data subject determine [sic] how use and disclosure 
is to be policed by the Commissioner." CL\RK, mpra, at 18. The European Union has 
considered a proposed directive on data privacy. It would have required member states to 
set up a centralized supervisory authority to which data gatherers would have had to re­
port. Proposal for a Council Directive Concerning the Protection of Individuals in Rela­
tion to the Processing of Personal Data, 1990 O.J. (C 277) 3, 7, 1 1 .  Cf Proposal for a 
Council Directive Concerning the Protec tion of Personal Data and Privacy in the Context 
of Public Digital Telecommunications Networks, in Particular the Integrated Services Dig­
ital Nenvork (ISDN) and Public Digital Mobile Nenvorks, 1990 O J. (C 277) 1 2. Germany, 
Norway, and Austria have set up dat..1 protection commissioners or cen tral executive agen­
cies. Spiros Simitis, Reviewing Privacy in an lnfonnation Society, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 707, 745 
(1987).  
73. See Miller, supra note 7 ,  at 1236; Murdock, supra note 7, at 6 18. 
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set up independent commissioners capable of continually updat­
ing regulations.74 Countries, he says, need a "mandatory frame­
work" insensitive to individual wishes, because data subjects 
"cannot determine the proper data processing conditions. "75 
This mindset, paradoxically, ignores individuality in the name of 
protecting individuals. 
B. Constitutional Protection of Data Privacy 
Several authors have suggested that the constitutional right of 
due process protects an individual ' s  liberty interest in privacy or 
property interest in controlling personal i nformation.76 
Although the U.S .  Supreme Court has never squarely addressed 
this argument, dicta in 'Whalen v. Roe77 suggest that such an argu­
ment might succeed. 
In ·whalen, the Court upheld New York's maintenance and use 
of a computer database listing users of certain  prescription drugs 
against liberty and privacy challenges under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.78 The Court, however, " [r ] ecogniz [ed] that in some 
circumstances [the] duty [to avoid unwarranted disclosure of 
data] arguably has its roots in the Constitution . "79 Because this 
case involved state action, the current Court is unlikely to extend 
any such due process right into a property interest enforceable 
against private parties.80 A constitutional solution, however, re-
74. Simitis, supra note 72, at 741 -43, 745. 
75. Id. at 736-37. 
76. See Francis S. Chlapowski, Note, The Constitutional Protection of Informational Privacy, 
71 B.U. L. REv 133, 1 35 (1991) (advocating both liberty and property protection and the 
use of an intermediate scrutiny analysis). Two other commentators have suggested similar 
proposals but have restricted their foci to privacy rights against the government. See Rob­
ert S. Peck, Extending the Constitutional Right to Privacy in the New Technological Age, 12 HoF­
STRA L. REv. 893, 898 ( 1 984) (advocating extension of constitutional right to privacy to 
"withholding personal information" from the government); Heyward C. Hosch III ,  Note, 
The Interest in Limiting the Disclosure of Personal Information: A Constitutional Analysis, 36 
VAND. L. REv. 1 41, 142-43, 179 ( l 983)(arguing "for the establishment of a fourteenth 
amendment liberty interest in limited disclosure" protected by rational relation review). 
One other author has argued for the constitutional recognition of a property right in 
information, though he has not applied that theory to individual privacy. See Michael A. 
Dryja, Infonnation as Property: Philosophy, Economics, and the Constitution, 25-41 ( Oct. 
1 992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the HARv. J.L. & Pus. PoL'Y) . 
77. 429 U.S. 602 (1977). 
78. !d. at 603-04 & n.32. 
79. !d. at 605. Concurring, Justice Brennan put this point even more strongly: " [T] he 
Constitution puts limits . . .  on the means [the state] may use to gather" information. !d. at 
607 ( Brennan, J., concurring). 
80. The Fourteen th Amendment's protection of life, liberty, and property only extends 
to deprivation by state action; it does not forbid purely private conduct. See Jackson v. 
Metropolitan Edison Co., 4 1 9  U.S. 345 (1974) ( l imiting state action to traditional public 
functions and duties and refusing to extend doctrine to all businesses affected with public 
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mains feasible because s tate courts could interpret their state 
constitutions to protect privacy even in the absence of state 
action.81  
C. The Tort of Commercial Dissemination of Private Facts 
One commentator has rej ected statutory solutions because 
" the inflexible nature of an across-the-board s tatutory remedy 
might render the remedy inadequate to deal with the fluid na­
ture of the information economy."82 Applauding the flexibility, 
innovative capacity, and insulation of courts, he has proposed 
making tortious the "unacceptable . . .  commercial dissemination 
of private facts . "83 He justifies the creation of this tort on the 
basis of the perceived "violat[ion of] our society's shared expecta­
tions of privacy. "84 Under this approach, courts would "evaluate 
the quality of the information exchanged" and decide what "nec­
essary and beneficial"  dissemination merits protection.85 Courts 
can best balance individual privacy interests against the public 
benefi ts of dissemination, he argues .86 This author provides few 
concrete details about how judges and juries should handle this 
task. 
I II .  PROBLEMS W1TH CENTRALIZED APPROACHES 
The statutory, constitutional, and tort solutions do not respect 
individual perceptions and valuations of privacy. They adopt 
Simi tis '  view that " [ w] hether or not the details of the intended 
re trieval are explained to them . . .  [data subjects] cannot deter­
mine the proper data processing conditions. "87 The tort solution,  
for example, requires judges to balance the utility of dissemina­
tion against the value of privacy to a reasonable person. It thus 
interest) . See genaally GEOFFR!.>' R. SToNE ET AL., CoNSTITUTIONAL L"w 1 593- 1 66 1  (2d ed. 
199 1 ) .  
8 1 .  For instance, the Cal ifornia Constitution protects privacy. See CAL. CaNsT. art. I , § 1 
(iisting right of privacy as inalienable right of all people) .  The California Supreme Court 
has suggested that this protectiotl applies against corporations as well as against the gov­
ernment. See White v. D avis, 533 P.2d 222, 234 (Cal. 1975) (en bane) (stating in dictum 
that the legislative history of the privacy amendment shows that i t  embraces "overbroad 
collection and rete n tion [ and improper use] of unnecessary personal information by gov­
ernment and business in terests") ; 7 BERNAP�T) E. TWlTKIN,  Su�lliL-\.RY or C.-\LIFORNL\ L-\.w 
§ 454 (9th ed. l98S) (same). 
82. Graham, supra note 43, at 1 424. 
83. lrl. at 1 426, 1 428, 1 430. 
84. /d. a t  1430. 
85. Jd. at 1 428, 1 430. 
86. ld. at 1 423 & n.l49. 
87. Simir.is, supra note 72, at 736; see supm text accompanying note 75. 
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implicitly relies on a societal judgment about the unacceptability 
of particular disclosures.88 Any such uniform standard based on 
the preferences of a non-existent reasonable person would im­
perfectly assess and allocate the social costs of withholding infor­
mation . People's  individual valuations of privacy vary greatly 
from those of a reasonable person .89 A tort solution, therefore, 
would give those who place a high value on privacy less of i t  than 
they desire and those indifferent to privacy more of i t  than they 
want.90 
Price theory buttresses this argument. As Nobel Laureate econ­
omist Friedrich von Hayek notes, there is no obj ective scale of 
values for commodities.91 Therefore, central planning cannot 
"compare or assess the relative importance of needs of different 
persons. "92 Because "demand is built up of innumerable incom­
mensurable scales of valuation," centralized solutions cannot 
take into account  and satisfy "individuals' subj ec tive valuations" 
and tradeoffs.93 Central plans, therefore, would allocate re­
sources inefficiently:94 They would keep some information pri­
vate although it would be worth more to merchants ,  and they 
would permit dissemination of other data the privacy of which 
people value highly. Each such case, whether it  involves the re­
lease of too li ttle information or too much, would produce an 
inefficient outcome. 
In contrast, the price mechanism takes into account  individual 
values, needs, and tradeoffs, allocating resources to their most­
valued uses.95 Pricing, unlike central planning, respects con­
sumer preferences.96 It adjusts resource-allocation decis ions to 
maximize value and swiftly takes changed circumstances into ac-
88. See sujna text accompanying notes 84-86. 
89. See supra Part I .B . l .  
90. O f  course, this i s  true o f  all torl<;. The law-and-economics explanation for why the 
law imposes tort liabil i ty is that "transaction costs with pote n tia l  vict ims . . .  are proh ibi­
tive. "  RICHARD A. PosNER, Ecor-.:o:-,uc ANAJ.YSrs OF LAw 1 64 (4th eel. 1 992) . That rationale 
does not apply here because the data subject and data gatherer communicate and can 
bargain freely ( except perhaps in  a monopoly situation) . 
9 1 .  Friedrich A. von Hayek, Socialist Calculation 1: The Nature and H istory of the Problem, in 
INDIVJDUALIS�d Ai'-:D Eco:'-lo�Hc ORDER 1 1 9 ,  1 37 ( 1 949) . 
92. Jd. 
93.  Georg Halrn, Further Considerations on the Possibility of Adequa te Calcu lation in a Social­
ist Community (H.E.  Batson trans. ) ,  in CoLLECTIVJST EcoNO�IIC PL�'INii'-:G 1 3 1 ,  1 83 (Fried­
rich A. von Hayek eel . ,  1 935) . 
94. !d. at 1 45 .  
9 5 .  ld. a t  1 4 1 ,  1 45 .  
96. Friedrich A.  v o n  Hayek, The Present State of the Debate, in  CoLLECTf\1ST EcoNO�IIC 
PL\:'-ii'-:!NG, sujJra note 93, at 20 1 ,  2 1 5 .  
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count.97 It i s  a prerequisite for rational economic decisions: 
"Without a pricing mechanism, there is no economic calcula­
tion."98 A contractual approach, by pricing information, would 
thus more efficiently allocate data than would a centrally 
planned solution. 
The importance of varied individual preferences becomes 
clearer if one considers a hypothetical: A mail-order retailer 
holds data on ten consumers ' buying habits .  The ten consumers 
attach widely differing values to the privacy of their buying hab­
its. cl values her privacy at $ 1 ,  c2 values his privacy at $2, and so 
on up to C10, who values her privacy at $ 1 0. A typical merchant, 
M, values each set of data at $6.50. One blanket rule for this sce­
nario would offer no privacy because M's  valuation is higher than 
those of the majority of the consumers. Such a one-size-fits-all 
rule is insensitive to individual wishes . C7,  C8, C9,  and C10 respec­
tively value their privacy $0.50, $ 1 .50, $2 .50, and $3.50 more than 
M values their information, yet they cannot protect  their privacy. 
If instead the blanket rule protected everyone ' s  privacy, C1 
through c6 would receive privacy that is worth less to them than 
the information is worth to M. From an efficiency standpoint, 
information should be put to its most-valued use. Therefore ,  the 
latter rule would inefficiently deny �;1 access to some of the data. 
Ideally, a solution should fi t its problem. In the case of regula­
tion of the information industry, perceptions and valuations of 
the privacy problem vary too greatly for a conventional , central­
ized solution to fit well. \Ve must therefore turn to the branch of 
the common law most sensitive to individual preferences: 
contracts . 
IV. A CoNTRACTUAL SoLUTION 
A. The Common Law 
Contracting parties, in theory, may freely draw up contracts 
specifying conditions of confidentiality.99 Classical contract law 
alone,  however, will not solve the privacy problem. Individuals 
release information in standard form contracts yet lack the 
97. Friedrich A. von Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, in li'DIVIDUALIS�t AND Eco­
NOMIC ORDER, supra note 9 1 ,  at 77, 87, 103. 
98. Ludwig von Mises, Die Wirtschaftsrechnung im sozialistischen Gemeinwesen, 47 ARCHTV 
FUR SoziALv\1SSENSCHAFTEN ( 1 920), translated and reprinted as Economic Calculation in the 
Socialist Commonwealth (S. Adler trans.) , in CoLLECT!V1ST EcONOM IC PLANNING, supra note 
93, at 87, 111. 
99. See GoRDON HuGHES, DATA PROTECTION rl'i AusTRALIA 22Jr-29 (1991). 
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power to renegotiate these contracts. Unequal bargaining 
power1 00 and start-up transaction costs prevent  individual con­
sumers from insisting on contractual rights to privacy. 1 0 1 No one 
business will absorb the costs of redrafting standard forms, imple­
menting privacy procedures, and educating consumers. 1 02 
B .  How Contractual Data Privacy ·would vVork 
A federal statute would require users of standard form con­
tracts to include an opt-in or opt-out clause. 1 03 The clause would 
govern release of information that the data subject disclosed to 
the data gatherer on that form or in later transactions pursuant 
to that form. 1 04 The penalty for failure to include such an option 
1 00. MILLER, supra note 67, at 2 1 4. 
1 0 1 .  In most transactions, the value of privacy to consumers, while significant, is proba­
bly dwarfed by the start-up transaction costs involved and by other considerations. For 
example, an individual desiring a Visa card will accept a bank's standard no-privacy terms 
when the cost of renegotiating the standard terms exceeds the difference between the 
value of privacy to the individual and the value of information to the bank. This is true 
even if his privacy is worth more to him than the information is worth to the bank. 
Additionally, consumers face enforcement problems. See infra note 1 08 for this Arti­
cle's free-market enforcement scheme. A privacy right is worth little to consumers if there 
is no enforcement mechanism to back it up. It might not be worth the trouble for busi­
nesses to start up privacy schemes because consumers would have no assurance that busi­
nesses were delivering the promised privacy. There is a chicken-and-egg problem here: 
Information sleuths (enforcers) will not come into existence until there is a big enough 
market to assure steady business and allow for economies of scale. Consumers, however, 
will not demand contractual privacy rights until there is an enforcement industry to make 
those rights meaningful. This Article's proposal would solve this quandary by creating a 
flood of privacy rights at once, thus encouraging information sleuths to commit time and 
capital to building up enforcement businesses. 
1 02. There may be isolated circumstances where transaction costs are so low and pri­
vacy is worth so much to consumers that a business will offer options of its own accord. In 
most industries, however, the start-up cost of establishing options and unilaterally inform­
ing consumers about their options would exceed the good>vil i  gained by the business. 
Although spreading the consumer-education costs over all businesses would reduce the 
cost, the transaction costs of coordinating education expenditures would be prohibitively 
high. 
1 03.  The choice of an opt-in or opt-out clause would be tied to the selection of a de­
fault rule. See infra note 1 06.  If the default rule provided privacy, the form would have an 
opt-out clause; otherwise it would have an opt-in clause. 
1 04.  For example, if a consumer requested privacy on a credit-card application, the 
credit-card company would have to keep private all information disclosed on that form 
and disclosed in the course of subsequent credit-card purchases. 
Special problems arise in the credit context because credit bureaus do not contract 
directly with debtors. Presumably credit bureaus could be made parties to the contract on 
an agency theory. The credit-card companies would contract as agents of the credit bu­
reaus. Under the law of agency for partially disclosed or undisclosed principals, both the 
credit-card companies and credit bureaus would be bound by the terms of the contracts. 
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 1 44,  1 86, 321-22 ( 1 958) . Alternatively, the 
credit-card companies could fully disclose their principals by naming the credit bureaus 
to which they planned to disclose daLe\. They could then contract to bind their principals 
to secrecy (on an agency theory) and additionally contract to bind themselves (under an 
ordinary bilateral contract) .  See id. §§ 1 44, 320. 
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would be imposition of an implied contractual duty not to spread 
the information outside the corporation or other entity. 1 05 The 
default rule (governing those who did not sign the clause) 1 06 
would match the prevailing expectations and practices in that 
type of business . 1 07 Public ignorance might necessitate a public­
service advertisement campaign to inform people of their privacy 
rights. Market incentives would encourage private agents to po­
lice p rivacy violations. 108 
1 05.  Thus, businesses that had no desire to disseminate information could save the cost 
of including the clause. 
106.  A default rule is a rule that fills gaps in contracts. It would specify, for a particular 
type of form, either that failure to sign the clause will result in privacy protection or that it 
will not. The orthodox view in contract law is that the law should set default terms at what 
most parties would have chosen had they explicitly addressed the issue. See, e.g. , PosNER, 
supra note 90, at 93; Charles ]. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Mitigation Principle: Toward a 
General Theory of Contractual Obligation, 69 VA. L. REv. 967, 971  ( 1 983) ;  see also Lewis v. 
Benedict Coal Corp., 361  U.S. 459, 468-69 ( 1 960) (applying this approach to setoffs of 
pension contributions) .  Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner, however, have noted that some­
times it is more efficient for the law to choose default rules that do not mimic parties' 
hypothetical desires. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An 
Economic Theary of Default Rules, 99 YALE LJ. 87, 91 ( 1 989) . Two of their considerations 
apply to the information industry. First, consumers desiring privacy are probably more 
likely to contract around a no-privacy default than consumers not desiring privacy are to 
contract around a privacy default. This factor weighs in favor of setting the default rule at 
no privacy. See id. at 93. Second, many consumers are unlikely to know of a no-privacy 
default. This factor supports setting the default rule at privacy, so that businesses have to 
inform the uninformed consumers to get them to opt out of privacy. See id. at 98. These 
two considerations point in opposite directions and, absent empirical evidence to the 
contrary, would seem to cancel each other out. The logical solution, therefore, would 
minimize the disruption of business by setting the default equal to whatever the currently 
prevailing norms are in an industry: for example, bank accounts would enjoy privacy (and 
so would have opt-out clauses) but magazine subscriptions would not (and so would have 
opt-in clauses) .  
1 07 .  Presumably Congress would ascertain these business expectations by making use 
of an investigatory subcommittee or independent agency. But these default rules should 
not be constantly revised; to respect contracting parties' expectations and reliance, the 
Jaw should be stable and secure. 
1 08.  Instead of relying on an inefficient government body to police violations, this con­
tractual scheme would generate policing by a band of information sleuths. ( Data subject.� 
could sue as well, but proving violations would be difficult unless the data subject had 
released a particular datum to only one business.) Entrepreneurs would submit decoy 
entries to various data banks via pseudonymous credit card applications, magazine sub­
scriptions, insurance applications, and the like. On the forms, the sleuths would request 
privacy for all information. If the decoys began receiving mail from outside the data­
gathering corporation, the sleuths would have proof of a violation and could sue for clam­
ages. These damages should be set at a statutory sum of liquidated damages plus attor­
ney's fees because it would be impossible to prove the quantum of actual damages. The 
attorney's fees provision would be analogous to the law of derivative shareholder suits 
against corporations. See, e.g., REYlSED MoDEL BusiNESS CoRP. Acr § 7.46 ( 1 984) . The fee 
award would encourage attorneys to police violations, turning them into private attorneys 
general. 
One could supplement this sleuthing scheme with rewards for whistle-blowing employ­
ees who revealed breaches of contractual privacy. 
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Users of standard forms would then have to offer inducements 
for the right to sell information, leading the market to price pri­
vacy efficiently. Market pricing would allocate information to i ts 
most-valued uses. Although a statute would provide the impetus, 
this approach would not be centrally planned; rather, the valua­
tions and tradeoffs would rest on individuals ' choices instead of 
blanket statutory determinations. I t  is impossible to tell a priori 
whether this solution would increase or decrease the flow of data, 
but that inquiry is i rrelevant. What matters, as Part III argues, is 
that market pricing based on individual preferences would cause 
information to flow to its most-valued uses. 
The market's treatment of silence will depend upon the type 
of data and the circumstances of the silence . With some types of 
data, such as mailing lists ,  data buyers will be unable to tell  that 
an individual has opted for privacy (as opposed to not being 
listed in a database in the first place) .  The market, therefore, will 
not draw adverse inferences from a person's choosing privacy. In 
many other situations, many people will opt for privacy because 
they value it  highly. When many people do so, the market will 
only read that choice as indicating that people value their privacy 
highly. The market under these circumstances will not impose 
significant costs on privacy. 
The interesting case occurs when most people value their pri­
vacy very l ittle :  Only those with something to hide and extreme 
privacy lovers ( call them hermits )  will choose privacy. In such 
situations, the market will read opting for p rivacy as a sign of 
concealment of damaging facts. It will then spread the costs of 
the presumed damaging facts (for example, bad credit history) 
over the privacy choosers (for example, by charging higher inter­
est rates) . Those concealing damaging facts deserve to pay this 
premium, because as Posner notes, "others have a legitimate in­
terest in unmasking the deception" and charging concealers ac­
curate rates. 1 09 But what of the hermit? As noted above , 
centralized solutions rest on shared social expectations of what 
should be private 1 1 0 and therefore would deny the hermit any 
privacy beyond what the majority wants . Because the majority will 
1 09.  Richard A. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REv. 393, 395, 399-400 
( 1 978) (stating that individuals have interest in discovering truth of those they deal wi.th 
instead of taking deceptive representations at face value and that inquiry is a way of un­
masking exploitation, misrepresentation, and misapprehension ) .  
1 1  0 .  See supra Part I II .  A. 
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care little about privacy in this situation,  1 1 1  a centrally planned 
solution would offer the hermit no privacy. The hermit, there­
fore, would prefer the contractual solution because it would al­
low her to choose to buy her privacy if she wishes . 
1 1 2  
C .  Advantages of a Contractual Approach 
In the hands of bureaucrats or judges, flexibility produces un­
certain ty for private parties. In the hands of the contracting par­
ties, however, flexibility allows people to control their lives and 
efficiently tailor the law to meet their needs. Flexibility is the 
market's forte; the pricing mechanism is extremely sensitive to 
variations in valuation and quickly adj usts to them. 
This flexibility would produce contractual changes even 
though consumers would have only two choices. Imagine a hypo­
thetical: Congress has set the default rule for mail-order vendors 
at no privacy. The Book-of-the-Month Club has ten customers, C1  
through C1 0 ,  most of whom loathe telephone solicitations but do 
not care as much about junk mail .  Table I displays a possible set 
of merchant valuations of telephone numbers and addresses and 
consumer valuations of privacy for the two types of information.  
l l l .  The scenario i n  this paragraph postulated (in the first sentence) that the m<Uority 
cared little about privacy in this situation. The reasoning in the text holds true for any 
situation in which fewer than half of all people care about privacy. The contractual solu­
tion, unlike a centralized one, respects both majority and minority preferences. 
1 1 2.  In contrast, a blanket solution would impose privacy on everyone for the sake of 
the hermit. Thus all consumers, regardless of whether or not they valued privacy highly, 
would have to pay a premium that reflected the costs imposed by the deceivers. This 
specter also raises the danger of faction: A well-organized minority could sate its privacy 
preferences by imposing privacy on everyone. This minority would spread privacy costs to 
the privacy-apathetic rn<Uority even though the latter would be unwilling to pay that much 
for privacy. It is fairer to impose any social costs on those most desiring privacy instead of 
inflicting them on everyone without regard to individual preferences. 
By making individuals bear the costs of privacy, moreover, the contractual solution 
would make each person reflect on how much he valued privacy. This argument does not 
rest on the overriding importance of the social benefits of data flow. It resl� on requiring 
individuals to weigh serious tradeoffs instead of imposing their own preferences upon 
others \vi th different valuations. The market would impose no undue penalty; its pricing 
would reflect the value of information, and individuals would be free to choose for them­
selves whether privacy is worth the costs. 
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TABLE I :  HYPOTHETICAL VALUATIONS OF INFORMATION 
Book-of-the-Month Club and Its Customers 
C3, C1, C5, C6, 
Value to: Merchant C1 and C2 C7, and Cs C9 and C10 
T)'pe of Information: 
Telephone Number $2 $2 $6 $ 1 1  
Address $7 $2 $4 $8 
Total Value $9 $4 $ 1 0  $ 1 9  
I f  the Book Club offers the choices: 
1 ) no privacy plus five dollars, or 
2 ) complete privacy, 
eight of the ten consumers will  contract for privacy because the 
privacy is worth more than five dollars to them. The Book Club 
will pay each of the remaining two consumers five dollars for 
their addresses and telephone numbers, sell these data for nine 
dollars per person, and make an eight dollar profit. The Book 
Club, however, can make more money if it unilaterally promises 
not to disclose anyone 's telephone number. If i t  offers the 
options: 
1 ) telephone-number privacy plus five dollars, or 
2)  complete privacy, 
then only two privacy lovers will contract for complete privacy. 
The other eight consumers will choose not to opt out. The Book 
Club, therefore, will  pay each of these eight consumers five dol­
lars, sell their addresses for seven dollars, and make a sixteen dol­
lar profit. The Book Club will prefer the latter scenario and will 
promise not to release telephone numbers . The threat of opting 
out by members on the margin will lead the Book Club to tailor 
its default disclosure terms to average consumer valuations. 1 1 3  
Similarly, the desire to keep consumers o n  the margin from opt­
ing out will lead information holders to offer inducements to all 
consumers. If preferences and values change , moreover, the 
price mechanism will lead parties to reallocate information 
11 3. Not only would this  system better reflect average p references, but  i t  would also 
provide a way out for those on the privacy-preferring end of the spectrum. 
The Book Club could, in theory, achieve the same resul t by offering consumers an 
option for telephone-number privacy as well as a total-privacy opt ion . But the additional 
costs of drafting and handling n ew forms would probably make this option impractical. 
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rights. No centralized solution can match the flexibility and dy­
namism of this contractual approach . 
CoNCLUSION 
We value the "right ' to be let alone.  "' 1 1 4  We also value the 
right to reap the benefits of an information economy. One-size­
fits-all proposals ignore the individual valuations and tradeoffs 
involved. They give privacy lovers too l ittle privacy and those in­
different to privacy too much privacy. 1 1 5  
By enabling people to contract for their optimal mix of privacy 
and financial benefits, government could leave it to the market 
to price privacy efficiently. The market would allocate informa­
tion to its most-valued uses instead of forcing privacy into a Pro­
crustean bed. The answer to Consumer Reports' rhetorical 
question, "What Price Privacy? , " 1 1 6 should be: whatever price the 
market will bear. 
1 1 4 .  Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 1 93 ,  
195  ( 1 890) ( quoting THmiAS CooLEY, LAw or ToRTS 29 (Chicago, Callaghan & Co . , 2d ed.  
1 888) ) .  
1 1 5 .  See supra Part III .  
1 1 6.  Wlwt Price Privacy ?, suf>ra note 7 .  
